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Abstract
We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms.
The firm's decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month,
which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional
value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this
value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional
capital to the firm's funds.
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Abstract
We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation
decisions of mutual fund firms. We show that firms add significant value by matching
capital to labor. We find that, following the firm’s decision to reallocate capital to
one of its managers, future value added increases significantly. We find no evidence
of a similar effect when a firm hires a manager from another firm. We conclude that
an important reason why firms exist is the private information that derives from
firms’ ability to better assess the skill of their own employees.
∗We thank Anat Admati, Peter DeMarzo, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, Paul Pfleiderer, Anamaria
Pieschacon and Michael Roberts for helpful comments and suggestions.
What makes a firm successful? Is it a characteristic of the firm itself, or is it simply
that a successful firm is a collection of particularly talented employees? Why do people
choose to work for firms rather than for themselves? Are employees more productive
when they work as part of a larger group? Clearly the firm plays an important role in
sharing risk, but does it have a role beyond that? As central as these questions are to the
economics of organizations, studying them empirically is difficult because, in most cases,
it is hard to measure employee productivity directly. In addition, it is equally difficult to
measure the counterfactual — what would have happened to an employee working for a
firm had she chosen to do the same job as an independent contractor.
There is now a large theoretical literature designed to answer these questions (see
Hart and Moore (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Hart (1995)). A key aspect
of modern theories of the firm is the concept of ownership. In a world with incomplete
contracting, incomplete information and bounded rationality, ex-post bargaining power
is affected by ownership. Asset owners, because they retain the rights of control, have in-
herently more bargaining power. An important insight of this literature is that firms exist
to ensure that ex ante ownership is concentrated to allow for efficient ex post outcomes.
Although these theories undoubtedly explain an important component of why modern
firms exist, they cannot explain a particular, and increasingly important, type of firm —
a firm that consists almost exclusively of human capital. Because these firms have little or
no physical capital, there is very little to own, other than perhaps some intangible capital
such as the firm’s brand name. Hence a primary reason for the existence of these types
of firms cannot be the assignment of ex-post bargaining rights through asset ownership.
Thus the aforementioned theoretical literature is silent on why these firms exist.
In this paper, we study one of the best examples of a sector that is dominated by firms
that own little or no physical capital: the mutual fund sector. A typical mutual fund
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company is essentially just a collection of people. Although in some sense the industry is
actually very capital intensive (the business is, after all, about investing financial capital),
what distinguishes this industry from other capital intensive industries is that the firm
does not own its capital. Instead, the customers of mutual fund companies, that is,
mutual fund investors, retain all ownership rights to their capital and in most cases can
call it back at any time. Thus, unlike a typical firm, the value of a mutual fund firm
does not include the value of the capital it needs to operate. So, in reality, mutual fund
firms actually comprise little else but a collection of people. Thus the ownership rights
to capital cannot play an important role in why mutual fund companies exist. Yet, as
Figure 1 shows, the mutual fund industry is dominated by large firms. As of April 2010,
the 5 largest asset management companies, which make up only 1% of the total number
of firms, hire 12% of all managers and manage 46% of all assets in the mutual industry.
What, then, does a mutual fund company bring to the table? Our objective in this paper
is to answer this question.
We demonstrate, empirically, that an important role of a firm in the mutual fund
sector is to efficiently match capital to skill. Mutual fund companies typically consist of a
collection of mutual funds, each of which is managed by one or more managers. Investors
invest their capital with firms by allocating their money to the firm’s funds. Thus the
amount of capital a typical mutual fund manager has under management is determined
by one of two parties: investors or firm executives. Investors allocate their capital to
particular mutual funds, and in doing so, also allocate capital to particular managers.
But, additionally, mutual fund executives decide which fund a particular manager is given
responsibility to manage. In a world with perfectly rational players, no frictions and no
information asymmetries, the role of mutual fund executives would be irrelevant because
investors themselves would efficiently allocate their own capital amongst managers. In
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Figure 1: Capital and Human Resources Controlled by the Five Largest Firms: This figure
reports the fraction of assets controlled by and the fraction of managers working for the 5 largest firms
(in assets under management) in April of each calendar year, for every year between 1977 and 2010. As
a point of comparison we also provide the 5 firms as a fraction of the total number of firms.
reality, what we find, is that mutual fund executives play a very important role in capital
allocation. Mutual fund firms appear to add substantial value by intermediating between
investors and managers and thereby efficiently matching capital to skill.
We begin the empirical analysis of the mutual fund industry by demonstrating that
there is an economically detectable role for mutual fund firms. We document the following
two facts. First, firm performance is persistent. Second, a manager’s future performance
is predictable by the past performance of other managers in the same firm. We then
explain the role of the firm by focusing on capital reallocation decisions within firms. We
find that such decisions lead to future increases in value added. A decision to increase a
portfolio manager’s responsibility by assigning an additional fund to that manager (that
is, a decision to increase the manager’s AUM), leads to an increase in the manager’s
subsequent value added. We find that at minimum, the decision to reallocate capital to
managers accounts for 39% of the total value added of the average manager.
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Because capital allocation decisions within the firm dwarf investor flows in and out
of funds, investors cannot replicate the firm’s decision themselves. We postulate that
the reason for this is that the firm has better information on the skill of its managers.
We provide supporting evidence in favor of this hypothesis: (1) flows of self employed
managers (single manager firms) are no different to flows of other managers, (2) external
promotion and demotion decisions (external hires that involve a change in AUM) do not
lead to a detectable change in future value added and (3) while past performance does
explain investor flows, it has very little explanatory power over firm capital reallocation
decisions. These facts are consistent with the hypothesis, first theorized by Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), that firm executives use other factors in making their capital reallocation
decisions and that these factors are not easily observable to people outside the firm.
1 The Mutual Fund Industry
In the last 50 years there has been a secular trend away from direct investment. Individual
investors used to make up more than 50% of the market, today they are responsible for
barely 20% of the total capital investment in U.S. markets. During that time there has
been a concomitant rise in indirect investment, principally in mutual funds. Rather than
invest directly in stocks, a mutual fund investor invests his money in a fund that buys
stocks on his behalf. Historically, mutual funds made up less than 5% of the market, today
they make up 1/3 of total investment.1 The industry itself has also changed. Initially
made up of only actively managed funds — funds where the fund manager claims to
add value by “beating the market”, that is, providing an expected return in excess of
the expected return provided by well diversified portfolio of equivalent risk, today 13%
1See French (2008).
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of the industry consists of index funds — funds that do not claim to provide an excess
return, but simply provide diversification services. In this study we will restrict attention
to actively managed mutual funds marketed to U.S. investors that never invest less than
2/3rds of their assets in stocks.
For our purposes the rise in the index fund industry is fortuitous because these funds
allow us to measure something that usually proves elusive to economists — what would
have happened if the firm had not used its resources to generate value. Because index
funds provide the lowest cost way for any investor to own a well-diversified portfolio, the
value added of a mutual fund can be measured by comparing its performance against
what would have happened had fund’s assets been invested in an index fund of similar
risk. The difference is the profits that accrue to the firm because of a skill in short supply,
and what we will call value added. This value added is calculated by first determining the
fund’s realized gross alpha – the difference between the return the fund generated from its
investments before any fees or expenses and the return that would have transpired had
the assets been invested in a set of index funds of comparable risk. The realized gross
alpha is then multiplied by the total amount of capital under management to provide the
total value the fund added over the alternative investment opportunity set.
We will follow Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) and use, as the alternative investment
opportunity set, the set of index funds offered by The Vanguard Group (see Table 1 for
the specific funds used). There are good reasons to use these index funds. First, Vanguard
is the firm that pioneered index funds and so we can be reasonably sure that the funds in
our set represent a set of investable opportunities at the time. Second, Vanguard is the
largest, and is widely regarded as the best, provider of diversification services. Finally,
Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) show that Vanguard funds have added value relative
to other index funds, that is, Vanguard provides these services at a lower cost than its
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average competitor.
Fund Name Ticker Asset Class Inception Date
S&P 500 Index VFINX Large-Cap Blend 08/31/1976
Extended Market Index VEXMX Mid-Cap Blend 12/21/1987
Small-Cap Index NAESX Small-Cap Blend 01/01/1990*
European Stock Index VEURX International 06/18/1990
Pacific Stock Index VPACX International 06/18/1990
Value Index VVIAX Large-Cap Value 11/02/1992
Balanced Index VBINX Balanced 11/02/1992
Emerging Markets Stock Index VEIEX International 05/04/1994
Mid-Cap Index VIMSX Mid-Cap Blend 05/21/1998
Small-Cap Growth Index VISGX Small-Cap Growth 05/21/1998
Small-Cap Value Index VISVX Small-Cap Value 05/21/1998
Table 1: Benchmark Vanguard Index Funds: This table lists the set of Vanguard
Index Funds used to calculate the Vanguard benchmark. The listed ticker is for the
Investor class shares which we use until Vanguard introduced an Admiral class for the
fund, and thereafter we use the return on the Admiral class shares (Admiral class shares
have lower fees but require a higher minimum investment.)
*NAESX was introduced earlier but was originally not an index fund. It was converted to an index fund
in late 1989, so the date in the table reflects the first date we included the fund in the benchmark set.
The benchmark return is the return on closest portfolio in the alternative investment
opportunity set to the mutual fund. If Rjt is the excess return (the realized return minus
the risk free rate) earned by investors in the j’th Vanguard index fund at time t, then the
benchmark return for fund i is given by:
RBit =
n(t)∑
j=1
βjiR
j
t , (1)
where n(t) is the total number of index funds offered by Vanguard at time t and βji is
obtained from the appropriate linear projection of the i’th active mutual fund onto the
set of Vanguard index funds. By using Vanguard index funds as benchmarks, we can be
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certain that investors had the opportunity to invest in the funds at the time and that
the returns of these funds necessarily include transaction costs and reflect the dynamic
evolution of active strategies.
The industry is characterized by a large number of firms that each market multiple
funds to investors. Funds are managed by individual managers. Managers can manage
multiple funds within a firm and funds can be managed by more than one manager.
Because of the SEC reporting requirements we are able to observe detailed information on
each fund. For our purposes we know the fund’s performance (i.e., realized returns), fees
charged, total assets under management and importantly, the identity of its manager(s).
Hence we observe instances when a manager switches firms as well as funds within firms.
We will use this variation to help identify the role the firm and the manager play in adding
value.
Customers provide the capital to mutual fund firms by investing in the firms’ mutual
funds. That is, mutual fund investors invest in funds, not firms. In that sense a firm
has little control over the amount of capital invested in its funds. A firm, cannot, for
example, arbitrarily move capital from one of its funds to another fund. That decision is
exclusively the purview of its fund investors. However, what firms can and do, in fact,
do is decide which manager gets to manage which fund. For that reason, the amount of
capital a particular manager has under his control is affected by two things: (1) investors’
decisions to put capital in or take capital out of the funds the manager manages, and (2)
firms’ decisions to either give the manager responsibility for managing an additional fund
or taking away that responsibility. By observing the second mechanism we will be able
to infer whether the firm adds value by assigning capital to labor.
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2 Data
We use the dataset in Berk and van Binsbergen (2013). This dataset, which is comprised
of monthly observations of all mutual funds since 1977 is compiled from combining two
databases, the CRSP survivorship bias free mutual fund database and the Morningstar
Principia database. The details on how the database was compiled from these two data
sources are in Berk and van Binsbergen (2013).
We augment that data with the manager information provided by both data sources.
Although both CRSP and Principia have information on fund managers and firms, this
information is not consistently recorded in both databases. In many cases individual
manager names are replaced with the words “Team Managed” and often how the man-
ager is named is not consistent.2 For this reason, we make use of a third data source:
Morningstar Direct. The Morningstar Direct database supposedly contains a clean and
complete list of managers and firms for each fund in Principia that is still in existence,
merged, or closed. However, there are examples of funds in Principia that are not in
Morningstar Direct, especially early in the sample. This suggests that the Morningstar
Direct database is not survivorship bias free. To make sure that we do not inadvertently
introduce a survivorship bias into our data, we only used Morningstar Direct to augment
our database. That is, we update the manager names on our existing database with in-
formation from Morningstar Direct, but, importantly, still keep and use the data in the
original database that we could not update. For those funds for which we cannot identify
a match in Morningstar Direct, we employ an automated algorithm as well as manual
screening to clean up the manager information.3
2In addition to examples of inconsistent spelling of a manager’s name, there other inconsistencies that
we need to address. For example, sometimes the full name is spelled out, sometimes only the manager’s
initials are used, and sometimes his/her middle name is included.
3For a detailed description, see the online appendix to this paper.
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We drop all observations without an identifier, as well as observations with missing
returns, AUMs, expense ratios or holdings information. We also remove all bond and
money market funds (funds that at some point in time had at least 1/3 of AUM in
bonds or cash) as well as index funds, by using the Principia special criteria indicator
and screening fund names. We aggregate different share classes of the same fund into
one fund, resulting in a database of 3628 funds. The final sample covers the period from
January 1977 to December 2010.
3 Definitions
Define the gross excess return at time t (that is, the return in excess of the risk free rate
but before management fees and expenses are taken out) of fund i as Rgit and the net
excess return (the gross return minus fees and expenses) as Rnit. The value added of fund
i is:
Vit ≡ qi,t−1
(
Rgit −RBit
)
(2)
where qi,t−1 is the amount of assets under management of fund i at t − 1 and RBit is the
return of the benchmark, that is, a passive strategy of equivalent riskiness. Vit is the value,
in dollars, the fund adds over and above what would have been earned if the capital was
invested in the passive benchmark. The value added by firm f at time t is the sum of all
value created by its funds:
Vft =
∑
i∈Ωft
Vit (3)
where Ωft is the set of all funds in firm f at time t.
Funds are managed by at least one manager in the firm and managers can manage
multiple funds. So we define the value added by manager m at time t as the sum of
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the value added of all the funds he manages. When manager m co-manages fund i with
Nit other manages, we ascribe
1
Nit
th of the value added from fund i to each of the Nit
managers. The manager’s value added is therefore given by,
Vmt =
∑
i∈Ωmt
Vit
Nit
(4)
where Ωmt is the set of all funds managed by m at time t. Using the same logic, the
manager’s AUM is:
qm,t−1 =
∑
i∈Ωmt
qi,t−1
Nit
, (5)
and the manager’s gross and net return are:
Rgmt =
1
qm,t−1
∑
i∈Ωmt
qi,t−1
Nit
Rgit (6)
Rnmt =
1
qm,t−1
∑
i∈Ωmt
qi,t−1
Nit
Rnit. (7)
To differentiate superior past performance from poor past performance we need a
measure to select funds. We use the firm skill ratio, defined in Berk and van Binsbergen
(2013) as follows:
SKRτf ≡
V̄ τf
σ
(
V̄ τf
) (8)
where V̄ τf =
∑τ
t=1
Vft
τ
is the average firm value added up to time τ and σ
(
V̄ τf
)
=
√Pτ
t=1(Vft−V̄ τf )2
τ
is the standard error of firm value added up to time τ .4 Note that the
skill ratio is essentially the t-statistic of the mean value added up until time τ .
4For ease of exposition, we have assumed that the fund starts at time 1. For a fund that starts later,
the start date in the skill ratio is adjusted to reflect this.
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4 Firms Have a Role
Do firms have a role or are they only a random collection of managers? To investigate
this question, we first establish two important characteristics of the data. First, we
demonstrate that firm performance is persistent, that is, firms that have added value in
the past keep adding value in the future. Second, we show that the future performance
of a manager is predictable by the past performance of other managers at the same firm.
These two results establish that there is a role for the firm.
4.1 Persistence in Firm Value Added
We demonstrate firm persistence by sorting funds into quantiles based on the skill ratio
of their firms and showing that funds that belong to firms with high skill ratios have
superior future performance. Using the firm skill ratio measured at each time t, we sort
funds into two quantiles, the top and bottom 50%.5 We then count the number of times,
over a specified future time horizon, that a fund outperforms the median fund.
To be included in this sort, we require a firm to have a fund with at least three years
of historical data. We estimate the fund’s future value added over a measurement horizon
of h months. Because we need a minimum number of months to estimate the fund’s
betas, we drop all funds with less than 18 observations in the measurement horizon. To
remove the obvious selection bias, for the remaining funds we drop the first 18 value
added observations as well, leaving the remaining observations exclusively in the horizon
{t+ 19, .., t+ h}. At each future time τ ∈ {t+ 19, .., t+ h} we compare the value added
of every fund to the value added of the median fund, and count the number of times the
fund’s value added exceeds the median value added. At the end of the horizon, funds are
5When we need to break a tie in the sort, we use the fund’s age to order older firms above younger
firms.
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again sorted on the firm’s skill ratio at that time, and the process is repeated as many
times as the data allows. At the end of the process we add up the total number of times
funds in each half of the sample beat the median fund.6 The first column of Table 2
reports the results. At the three and four year horizon, funds of firms with above median
skill ratios significantly outperform (at the 95% confidence level) funds of firms with below
median skill ratios.
We repeat the above analysis sorting funds into the top decile and bottom decile
based on their firm’s skill ratio, as well as top quintile and bottom quintile. That is, in
the measurement horizon we restrict attention to top and bottom decile/quintile funds
and record the number of times each fund outperforms the median fund in the restricted
sample. The second and third column of Table 2 reports the results. At all horizons, and
for both quintile and decile sorts, the results show that funds from firms with higher skill
ratios statistically outperform (at the 95% confidence level) funds from firms with lower
skill ratios.
4.2 Predicting a Manager’s Performance by the Past Perfor-
mance of His Colleagues
We next establish that a manager’s future performance can be predicted by the past
performance of other managers at the same firm. To do this test, we complete the following
three steps for every fund i: (1) We identify the set of managers managing fund i, (2)
we identify all funds in the firm managed by any member of this set of managers, and
6The main difficulty with implementing this strategy is uncertainty in the estimate of the fund’s
betas. When estimation error in the periods before the sort is positively correlated to the error in the
measurement horizon, a researcher could falsely conclude that evidence of persistence exists when there is
no persistence. To avoid this bias we do not use information from the periods before the sort to estimate
the betas in the periods after the sort. This means that we require a future horizon of sufficient length
to produce reliable beta estimates, so the shortest horizon we use to measure future performance is three
years.
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Top x% Outperforms Bottom x%
x = 50 x = 20 x = 10
3 Years 50.57∗ 51.13∗ 51.46∗
(0.17) (0.30) (0.39)
4 Years 50.55∗ 50.93∗ 51.18∗
(0.18) (0.33) (0.43)
5 Years 50.51 50.87∗ 50.98∗
(0.39) (0.43) (0.46)
Table 2: Predicting Fund Performance Using Firm Skill: We report the fraction of times (in
percentages) a fund sorted into the top x% quantile (based on its firm’s skill ratio) has higher realized
value added than the median fund over the next 3, 4, or 5 years. Standard errors, clustered by date, are
given in parentheses. * indicates that the estimate is significantly greater than 50% at the 95% confidence
level.
(3) we recalculate the firm’s skill ratio excluding those funds, hereafter, the adjusted skill
ratio. We then sort funds using the adjusted skill ratio and proceed with the same test
as described in the previous section. By completing these three steps, we ensure that the
adjusted skill ratio by which we sort a fund is only driven by information regarding the
other funds in the firm. That is, there is no overlap in the managers involved in fund i
and the corresponding adjusted skill ratio. Table 3 tabulates the resulting statistics using
2, 5 and 10 quantiles. The table shows that funds sorted into the top quantile significantly
outperform the bottom quantile for all 3 sorts and over all 3 measurement horizons.
Top x% Outperforms Bottom x%
x = 50 x = 20 x = 10
3 Years 50.31∗ 50.73∗ 50.86∗
(0.13) (0.22) (0.29)
4 Years 50.30∗ 50.58∗ 50.95∗
(0.14) (0.23) (0.31)
5 Years 50.44∗ 50.70∗ 50.91∗
(0.14) (0.23) (0.32)
Table 3: Predicting Managers’ Performance by Their Peers: We report the fraction of times (in
percentages) a fund sorted into the top x% quantile (based on skill ratio of other managers belonging to
the same firm but not managing this fund) has higher realized value added than the median fund over
the next 3, 4, or 5 years. Standard errors, clustered by date, are given in parentheses. * indicates that
the estimate is significantly greater than 50% at the 95% confidence level.
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Although, taken together, these results clearly establish that a firm is not merely a
random collection of managers, they do not provide additional insight into what the exact
role of the firm is. At first glance, it might seem that the most direct way to study the role
of the firm would be to estimate an attribution model. Managers move frequently enough
between firms to form a very well-connected network. So the most obvious approach to
studying the role of the firm is to estimate a panel regression that includes fixed effects
for firms and managers. Unfortunately, the results of such an approach would be difficult
to interpret because manager moves are endogenous. Conceivably, the firm could merely
be a co-ordination device for managers to work together. To avoid the aforementioned
endogeneity problem, in the next section we study the role of the firm by concentrating
on internal moves within the firm. The advantage of focusing attention on these moves is
that our results cannot be driven by managers self selecting into firms.
5 Matching Capital with Skill
In this section we focus on one specific potential role of the firm: matching capital to skill.
We take as the Null hypothesis the neoclassical model as described in Berk and Green
(2004). Under those assumptions investors already invest the optimal amount of capital
in funds and therefore there is no role for the firm to assign more or less capital to its
fund managers.
To test this Null, we study changes in value added after internal capital allocation
decisions by firms. Firms make these allocation decisions when they either give a fund to
a manager to manage and thereby increase the manager’s AUM, hereafter a promotion,
or take away a fund from a manager and thereby decrease the manager’s AUM, hereafter
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Capital Reallocation 0.496∗
(0.197)
• Promotion 0.669∗
(0.278)
• Demotion 0.193
(0.331)
Year FE Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes
Table 4: Matching Capital with Skill: This table reports statistics on the value added (in $
Millions/month) through internal capital reallocation by the firm. The first row reports the coeffi-
cient estimate from equation (9). The next two rows report the estimates from (10). Standard errors,
heteroskedasticity-robust and two-way clustered by manager and manager group × year, are provided in
parentheses. * indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
a demotion.7
We begin by focusing attention on promotions and demotions together, that is, we
run the following panel regression:
Vmt = λy + λm + β · 1internalmt + εmt (9)
where Vmt is the estimated value added of manager m at time t (defined in (4)); 1
internal
mt
is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if manager m is internally promoted
or demoted at or before time t; λm are manager fixed effects; and λy are year fixed effects
to control for any general time trends in managers’ ability to add value. The results
are reported in the first column of Table 4. The firm adds $496,000 per month when it
makes a decision to either promote or demote one of its managers. This point estimate is
statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Estimates of equation (9) can be biased if the capital reallocation decisions are corre-
lated with past performance. If a manager is promoted (demoted) after superior (poor)
7Because we need to observe the manager’s performance at the same firm after the demotion decision,
we have to exclude demotions that are also termination decisions.
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performance, and if past performance has a component that is due to good (bad) luck,
then in expectation the manager’s future performance will mean revert.8 Consequently,
bad luck will be measured as future value added and good luck will be measured as value
destroyed by the manager. To examine the importance of this issue, we further split the
manager move dummy 1internalmt into two dummies, one for promotion (1
P
mt), and one for
demotion (1Dmt). The promotion dummy takes on the value of 1 if the most recent capital
reallocation decision resulted in a net increase in the manager’s assets under manage-
ment. Similarly, the demotion dummy takes on the value of 1 if the most recent capital
reallocation decision resulted in a net decrease in the manager’s AUM. We then run the
following panel regression:
Vmt = λy + λm + βP · 1Pmt + βD · 1Dmt + εmt (10)
where the definitions of all other variables are consistent with those from equation (9).
The second column of Table 3 reports the results. The coefficients on the promotion and
demotion dummies are positive, and importantly, the promotion dummy is statistically
significantly different from zero. Because the mean reversion biases the coefficient on the
promotion dummy downwards, we can be certain that this bias is not driving the rejection
of our Null. In summary, we establish at the 95% significance level that firms’ decisions
to promote their managers add value on average.
The point estimate of the coefficient on the demotion dummy is positive, as one would
expect if the decision to demote is optimal. If the manager was managing too much money
and thereby destroying value (perhaps by trading too much) the decision to demote will
increase the manager’s value added. However, caution is in order. First, the coefficient is
8As we will presently show, past performance does indeed predict promotion and demotion decisions
(see Table 5).
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not significantly different from zero and second, it is biased upwards by the aforementioned
mean reversion bias.
The value added numbers reported in Table 4 are quantitatively large. However, the
size of these estimates should be interpreted with caution because we don’t know the
counterfactual. That is, we don’t know what would have happened had the firm not
reassigned the capital. Presumably investors would have eventually learned about the
manager’s quality and, over time, directed capital towards the manager. Our estimate is
therefore an upper bound on how much value the firm adds by matching capital to labor
because it implicitly assumes that no capital adjustment would have occurred through
the flow of funds. In the short term, this implicit assumption is not unrealistic; the
magnitude of the firm’s capital allocation decisions dwarfs the magnitude of inflows and
outflows. However, over longer periods of time, inflows and outflows could, in principle,
accumulate and eventually lead to an overall change in AUM that is commensurate with
the magnitude of promotions and demotions. So to correctly assess the magnitude of the
marginal value added of the firm, we must construct a counterfactual.
To construct a realistic counterfactual, we focus exclusively on promotions and assume
that the manager’s subsequent inflows would match the inflows, over the same time pe-
riod, of a comparable set of funds. Rather than construct a single counterfactual from a
one set of comparables, we construct a range of counterfactuals. We construct the first
counterfactual by assuming the promoted manager would have experienced the same per-
centage increase in her AUM as the weighted average percentage increase due to flows
of all funds in that month. We then narrow the set of comparable funds by eliminat-
ing poorly performing funds. That is, we eliminate all funds whose monthly net return
over the benchmark was below a particular quantile and then assume that the manager’s
percentage inflows would have been the same as the weighted average percentage inflow
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of the remaining funds. For example, the second counterfactual eliminates the funds in
the bottom 10% and computes the flow of funds by taking the weighted average of the
remaining 90%. The third counterfactual eliminates the bottom 20% and we continue
this process up to the extreme counterfactual which eliminates the bottom 99%, and thus
computes the flows by taking the weighted average of the top 1%.
Using the percentage increases computed under the counterfactual fund flows, we re-
compute what the AUM of the fund would have been. We do this until the counterfactual
AUM either grows to the manager’s actual AUM or the manager is demoted. Once either
event occurs, we use the actual AUM from then onwards. We then re-estimate the value
added of a promotion using the counterfactual AUM.
Formally, then, the value added of the manager can then be expressed in terms of the
counterfactual as follows:
Vmt =
(
q0m,t−1 +
(
qm,t−1 − qCm,t−1
)
+
(
qCm,t−1 − q0m,t−1
) )(
Rgmt −RBmt
)
where qmt denotes the actual AUM of managerm at time t; q
C
mt denotes the AUM under the
counterfactual; and q0mt to denotes the AUM of the manager at the time of the promotion.
The first term measures the manager’s value added without the promotion and without
future inflows or outflows. The second term measures the contribution to the managers
value added of the promotion. The last term measures the contribution to value added by
investors under the counterfactual. To measure just the contribution of the promotion,
we need to drop the third term. Thus, define the adjusted value added:
V̂mt ≡
(
q0m,t−1 +
(
qm,t−1 − qCm,t−1
) )(
Rgmt −RBmt
)
= Vmt ·
q0m,t−1 + qm,t−1 − qCm,t−1
qm,t−1
.
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To estimate the magnitude of the value added of just the promotion we replace Vmt with
V̂mt over the time period from the promotion until the first time V̂mt > Vmt or the manager
is demoted (whichever comes first). We then repeat the previous test, that is, we estimate
(10), using the counterfactually computed value added. Figure 2 plots the coefficient on
the promotion dummy over a range of different counterfactuals corresponding to flows
computed from performance quantiles ranging from all funds to only funds whose per-
formance is in the top 1%. Even under the extreme assumption that the counterfactual
is computed solely from funds in the top 1% of the performance distribution, the firm’s
contribution to value added is still very large ($506, 076 per month).
Figure 2: Firm Value Added Under Realistic Counterfactuals: We construct the counterfactual
by excluding all funds with performance below the indicated percentile and then assume that under the
counterfactual a fund would have experienced the same percentage increase in its AUM as the weighted
average percentage increase of all remaining funds in that month.
Another way to assess the overall impact of promotions is to ask how long it would have
taken for investors to achieve the reallocation of funds the promotion decision achieved.
To answer this question, under each counterfactual, we compute how many years it would
have taken for investors to provide the equivalent amount of additional AUM through
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Figure 3: Time Taken to Reach Same AUM under the Counterfactual: Under each counter-
factual, we compute how many years it would have taken for investors to provide the equivalent amount
of additional AUM through the flow of funds alone.
the flow of funds alone. That is, for each promotion decision we compute the number of
years it takes for V̂mt > Vmt. If this date does not occur by the last date of our sample,
we assume that capital will continue to flow at a rate equal to the average flow of funds
under the counterfactual over our entire sample. That is, fund flow after 2010 is assumed
to be equal to the average historical fund flow under the counterfactual. We then average
the time taken across all promotions for given counterfactual. Figure 3 plots the results
over the same set of counterfactuals as before. Even for the counterfactual computed
using the top 1% of funds, it would have taken investors 11 years to achieve what the
firm achieved in a single month. Clearly, the firm’s capital reallocation decisions are much
more important in determining the manager’s AUM than the flow of funds.
We end this section by estimating a lower bound on the total value a typical mutual
fund firm creates by correctly matching capital to skill. Because we are computing a
lower bound, we can focus exclusively on promotions where we have the most confidence
20
in our estimates. Obviously, our estimate depends on our assumption on what would have
happened had the promotion not occurred, so we use the same set of counterfactuals as
before. Taking the estimates for the value added of a promotion reported in Figure 2, we
multiply this estimate by fraction of months in which the promotion dummy is equal to
one to get the average value of a promotion decision. Figure 4 reports this number as a
fraction of the total value added by an average manager (which is $237, 573 per month).9
Even for the extreme counterfactual where flows are assumed to be equivalent to the
flows of the top 1% of funds, a lower bound on the average value added by the firm is
$92,612/month which accounts for 39% of the total value added by an average manager.
Figure 4: Lower Bound Firm Value Added by Promotions: We generate a lower bound on
the total value a typical mutual fund firm creates by multiplying the value of a promotion under each
counterfactual by the fraction of periods in which the promotion dummy is equal to one. We then divide
this estimate by the average value added per manager per month to obtain the contribution of the firm
as a fraction of total value added by the mutual fund industry.
9That is, the average Vmt across all managers at all points in time.
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6 Source of Firm Skill
The results in the previous section imply that the amount of capital under management
affects a manager’s ability to generate value. Although such a result might seem obvious,
as we have already pointed out, it is in fact not consistent with the standard neoclassical
assumptions in Berk and Green (2004). In that model, investor fund flows are always
sufficient to make sure that managers have enough capital to extract the maximum amount
of value from markets. If, in fact, the manager was managing the optimal amount of
capital before being promoted, she would not be able to put the new capital to productive
use, resulting in no increase in value added (the additional fees generated would have
to come from investors, leaving value added unchanged). The fact that adding capital
creates value implies that, for whatever reason, the manager was not managing the optimal
amount of capital prior to the promotion, and, more importantly, this misallocation was
corrected by a decision made by the firm (rather than by investors).
A key assumption in Berk and Green (2004) is that investors and managers have the
same information about the manager’s ability. Thus one possible explanation for our
results is an asymmetry of information between investors, managers and firms. As a
consequence of this asymmetry, firms have a role intermediating between managers and
investors. Promotion decisions add value because firms have more information than in-
vestors about managerial ability and firm executives use this information to direct capital
towards better managers.10
A concern that one might have interpreting the value added by the firm as rents for
private information, is that investors might rationally anticipate the firm’s capital reallo-
10Note that if managers know their own ability and are able to borrow (or go short) the firm would
not need to intermediate. This explanation for our results therefore requires that one or both of these
conditions are also violated.
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cation decisions in determining their own investment decisions. That is, it is conceivable
that investors have the same information as the firm, but knowing that firms will reallo-
cate capital for them, investors rationally choose not to allocate capital themselves. In this
case our estimate of value added by the firm measures a transfer of duty from investors
to firms, but does not represent additional value creation by the firm. Of course, since it
is costly to run a firm, this hypothesis begs the question of why an investor would pay
somebody else to do something they could do themselves. Nevertheless, to test the plau-
sibility of this hypothesis we compare the flow of funds relation of funds of self-employed
managers and those in firms.
In our sample there are firms that consist of a single manager (self-employed man-
agers). By construction, these firms cannot reallocate capital between managers and
therefore constitute a natural control group. We test for differences in the flow of fund
performance relation between single manager and other firms by running the following
regression over horizons of τ = 1, 3, 6 or 12 months:
flowmt = α + (β + γ1
s
mt)
τ−1∑
s=0
1
τ
(
Rnm,t−s −RBm,t−s
)
+ εmt (11)
where flowmt is the percentage change in manager m’s assets under management in period
t that is attributable to the fund flow from investors; 1smt is a dummy variable that takes
on the value of 1 if manager m is self-employed at time t and 0 otherwise. γ in (11)
compares the sensitivity of the flow performance relation of self-employed managers with
all other managers. Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates.
For both types of funds (those in single-manager firms and those in multi-manager
firms), fund flow responds significantly to performance. But more importantly for our
purposes, γ is only significantly different from zero at the 1 year horizon and in that case
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1-Months 3-Months 6-Months 12-Months
β -0.001 0.377∗ 0.739∗ 1.399∗
(0.103) (0.110) (0.122) (0.123)
γ 0.009 -0.191 -0.437 -0.894∗
(0.140) (0.194) (0.342) (0.434)
Table 5: Sensitivity of Fund Flow to Performance: This table reports the coefficient estimates
of equation (11) over the past 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Standard errors, in parentheses, are two-way
clustered by fund and by date. * indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the
95% confidence level.
the point estimate is negative. There is no evidence that the flow of funds performance
relation is stronger for single manager firms than for multiple manager firms. Therefore,
there is no evidence that investors anticipate the promotion and demotion decisions of
the firm.
Presumably the firm’s information advantage results from its unique ability to observe
its own employees. Consequently, if private information plays an important role in the
firm’s decisions, we should expect internal capital allocation decisions to add more value
than capital reallocations that result from managers changing firms. With this test in
mind, define an external promotion as a change in jobs that is also accompanied by an
increase in the manager’s AUM. Similarly, an external demotion is a job change that is
accompanied by a decrease in the manager’s AUM. We repeat the same tests as we did
for internal capital changes using these two definitions. The results are reported in the
third and fourth columns of Table 6. None of the coefficients are significantly different
from zero. Thus our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the firm’s competitive
advantage in assigning capital to skill derives from its ability to closely observe its own
employees.
If one were willing to assume that investors’ information set contains no more infor-
mation than what is available in past returns, then an alternative way to measure the
importance of the firm’s informational advantage is to measure how much of the capital
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Internal External
Capital Reallocation 0.496* -0.014
(0.197) (0.233)
• Promotion 0.669* -0.019
(0.278) (0.288)
• Demotion 0.193 -0.009
(0.331) (0.274)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Comparing Internal with External Capital Reallocations: This table reports statistics
on the value added (in $ Millions/month) through internal and external capital reallocations by the firm.
The first row reports the coefficient estimate from equation (9) for both internal and external promotion
dummies. The next two rows report the estimates from (10). Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust
and clustered by manager, are provided in parentheses. * indicates that the estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
reallocation decision can be explained by past performance alone. To do this, we run a
probit model where we regress the promotion (or demotion) event, expressed as a dummy
in that period, on the manager’s performance in excess of the benchmark over the previous
6 months, 7-18 months and the entire history, T , from then onwards, up to a maximum
of 10 years. Writing this out formally, first define
α̂6mt ≡
6∑
s=1
1
6
(
Rnm,t−s −RBm,t−s
)
α̂18mt ≡
18∑
s=7
1
12
(
Rnm,t−s −RBm,t−s
)
α̂120mt ≡
T̂∑
s=19
1
T̂ − 18
(
Rnm,t−s −RBm,t−s
)
where T̂ ≡ min(T, 120). We then restrict attention to managers with at least two years
of historical data and run the following probit panel regression:
Pr[1move typemt = 1] = Φ
(
β + β6α̂
6
mt + β18α̂
18
mt + β120α̂
120
mt
)
(12)
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where the indicator function 1move typemt equals one if the move event under consideration
occurs to manager m at time t. Estimates of the coefficients of equation (12) and pseudo-
R2 are reported in Table 7 where we separately consider internal and external promotions
and demotions. Few of the beta coefficients are significantly different from zero so it
appears that little of the promotion or demotion can be attributable to past performance.
The pseudo-R2 of the regressions are extremely low. Only 0.02% (0.23%) of the decision to
promote (demote) a manager can be explained by past performance, suggesting that other
factors play a more important role in the decision. The extent to which these other factors
are attributable to the firm’s informational advantage can be gauged by comparing these
results to what we get when we use external promotions rather than internal promotions
in the estimation. The pseudo-R2 for internal promotions and demotions are 0.03% and
0.44% respectively (see Table 7). Both of these numbers are higher than their counterparts
for internal moves, supporting our hypothesis that private information plays a role in
internal capital allocation decisions.
The pseudo-R2 coefficients of a probit regression should be interpreted with caution.
That said, they are remarkably small. One way to benchmark these results is to compare
them to investor decisions to reallocate capital. Presumably, in this case past performance
is the most important criteria for reallocating capital. Consequently, we also report, in
Table 7, the pseudo-R2 coefficients for investors’ decision to promote or demote. We
define an investor promotion (demotion) dummy which takes on the value 1 in months
when a manager receives a net inflow (outflow) of funds from investors, and 0 otherwise.
Using these dummies, all the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero
and the pseudo-R2 coefficients are 3.17% for promotions and 3.36% for demotions. The
dramatically smaller pseudo-R2 coefficients for firm reallocations of capital is consistent
with the hypothesis that firm executives use other factors in making their decisions.
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Panel A: β Estimates
R2 1-6 Months 7-18 Months 18-120 Months
Promotion
Internal 0.02% 0.974 2.507∗ 0.839
(0.685) (0.946) (1.517)
External 0.03% 0.328 1.896 2.849
(0.722) (1.106) (1.548)
Investor 3.17% 22.40∗ 27.25∗ 9.205∗
(0.551) (0.914) (1.360)
Demotion
Internal 0.23% -6.863∗ -1.422 -0.056
(0.878) (1.166) (1.639)
External 0.44% -5.649∗ -8.826∗ -0.198
(1.021) (1.399) (1.832)
Investor 3.36% -24.66∗ -26.21∗ -7.649∗
(0.549) (0.914) (1.382)
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Prob. 1-6 Months 7-18 Months 18-120 Months
Promotion
Internal 0.96% 0.026% 0.066% 0.022%
External 0.62% 0.006% 0.034% 0.052%
Investor 51.2% 8.935% 10.87% 3.672%
Demotion
Internal 0.63% -0.137% -0.028% -0.001%
External 0.43% -0.084% -0.132% -0.003%
Investor 46.1% -9.835% -10.45% -3.050%
Table 7: Predictability of Promotions and Demotions: Panel A of this table reports estimated
coefficients and Pseudo R2 for a probit regression of a promotion (or demotion) dummy on historical
realized alpha (over the past 1-6 months, 7-18 months, and the remaining history of the fund up to 10
years). Provided in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by fund manager. Estimates significant at
5% are highlighted with ∗. Panel B of this table reports the probability of a promotion (or demotion) and
the marginal effect historical alphas have on the probability of being promoted (or demoted). Marginal
effects provided are for a 0.01 (1%) increase in a regressor while keeping other regressors fixed.
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If, indeed, the firm’s ability to assign capital to labor derives from private information
about employee skill, then this advantage should be more apparent for newer employees.
To test this hypothesis, we define manager tenure as the length of time (in months) since
the manager first entered our data sample. If investors learn the skill of managers from
their historical performance, we should expect that the firm’s informational advantage
to decrease with manager tenure. We therefore sort managers into quintiles based on
their tenure. Because our data sample begins in 1977, tenure is censored from above.
We address this issue by starting the analysis in 1987,11 and for every promotion in
the remaining sample we calculate the ratio of the magnitude of the promotion to the
manager’s AUM just before the promotion. We then average over all managers in the
quintile to get the average fraction of promotion to AUM. We then repeat the same
analysis using the definition of investor promotion above. That is, we restrict attention
to positive inflows, and divide those inflows by the AUM prior to the inflow and average
across all observations in each quintile. Figure 5 plots the ratio of these two averages
(average promotion as percentage of AUM over average positive fund flow as percentage
of AUM) for each of the age quintiles. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find the firm’s
role in capital allocation is significantly larger for newer employees.
Taken together our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms use additional
information not available to investors to make capital reallocation decisions.
7 Conclusion
Arguably one of the most important questions in economics is why firms exist. A large
literature has addressed this question both from a theoretical and an empirical point of
11A manager who has been in the sample for more than 10 years is always in the top quintile.
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Figure 5: Size of Promotions by Manager Tenure: Starting in 1987, we sort managers into
quintiles based on their tenure. Within each quintile, we calculate the average size of a promotion as
a percentage of the promoted manager’s initial AUM. We also compute the average percentage change
in AUM as a result of positive fund flow. This table reports the ratio of these two averages (average
promotion as percentage of AUM over average positive fund flow as percentage of AUM).
view. In this paper, we establish a new role for the firm by studying capital reallocation
decisions of mutual fund firms. We show that firms add significant value by matching
capital to labor. That is, following the firm’s decision to reallocate capital to one of its
managers, future value added increases significantly. We find no evidence of a similar
effect when a firm hires a manager from another firm. This is consistent with the idea
that an important competitive advantage of the firm is its ability to better assess the skill
of its own employees.
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